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Notes
The Problem of Reverse Payments in the
Pharmaceutical Industry Following Actavis
Traci Aoki
Reverse payments are payments that are made as a component of a patent infringement
settlement, between a brand-name pharmaceutical company to a competitor who is
attempting to market a generic version of the patented brand-name drug. The patentee not
only drops its patent infringement suit against the generic manufacturer, but also
compensates this alleged infringer. Reverse payment settlements raise antitrust concerns
because they suggest that the generic manufacturer could have proved the brand-name’s
patent either invalid or non-infringed, and thus entered the marketplace to provide
consumers with lower priced generic drugs, if they had continued with the litigation. This
also insinuates that the motive behind the payment was to persuade the generic
manufacturer to delay marketing its lower priced drug, and therefore prolong the brandname company’s monopoly. By settling with the generic manufacturer, the brand-name
company is able to continue selling its pharmaceutical at a monopoly-set price, at the
expense of consumers who are forced to pay higher costs for their medications.
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court held that reverse payment settlements
sometimes violate antitrust laws, and that each settlement should be reviewed on a caseby-case basis, under the antitrust rule of reason standard, to determine if it is illegal.
Under the rule of reason, courts must weigh the procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects of the settlement to determine whether the payment is reasonable. The Supreme
Court, however, declined to provide a framework for the rule of reason analysis of
reverse payment settlements, leaving it to the lower courts to establish.
Following this decision, district courts have diverged greatly in their application of
Actavis to the reverse payment settlements before them. Some courts believe Actavis
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directs antitrust scrutiny only to settlements involving monetary payment, while others
believe the holding also applies to noncash settlements. This Note argues that Actavis
antitrust scrutiny should be applied not only to monetary settlements, but also to
nonmonetary settlements, because reverse payments can bring a risk of significant
anticompetitive effects regardless of the particular form of the transfer of value.
Additionally, this Note proposes a model of analysis to apply when determining whether
the terms of a nonmonetary settlement violate antitrust law.
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Introduction: The Problem of Reverse Payments
in the Pharmaceutical Industry
One of the most significant economic problems facing Americans
1
today is rising healthcare costs. A large part of this expenditure stems
from pharmaceutical purchases. Pharmaceutical spending in 2014
2
reached $373.9 billion, a 13.1% increase from 2013. Generic versions of
brand-name pharmaceuticals produce tremendous cost benefits, saving
consumers, taxpayers, businesses, and federal and state programs
3
$239 billion in 2013 alone. However, these lower priced options are
eliminated when pharmaceutical companies engage in reverse payment
settlements and conspire to keep generics off the market, leaving the
brand-name drug as consumers’ only option.
“Reverse payment” or “pay-for-delay” settlements occur when a
brand-name pharmaceutical company that is suing a generic
manufacturer for patent infringement drops its lawsuit and instead pays
the generic company to delay marketing its generic drug until a specified
4
date. This flow of consideration from the patentee, brand-name
pharmaceutical company to the generic manufacturer contrasts with that
of traditional patent infringement settlements, where infringing parties
pay patentees to drop the lawsuits against them. These reverse payment
settlements delay both the availability of generic drugs to consumers and
competition among pharmaceutical companies, raising strong antitrust
concerns. As reverse payment settlements become increasingly popular
in the pharmaceutical industry, steps must be taken to combat their
5
anticompetitive effects.
The main problem with reverse settlements is that the benefits they
provide for the brand-name pharmaceutical company and the generic
drug manufacturer are often at the expense of consumers, who are forced
to pay higher prices for their medications. According to a recent Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) statement, “eliminating these pay-for-delay
settlements would still save consumers $35 billion over ten years—or
6
about $3.5 billion per year.” This is because, on average, generic drugs

1. See Harriet Komisar, The Effects of Rising Health Care Costs on Middle-Class
Economic Security 1 (2013), http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/
security/2013/impact-of-rising-healthcare-costs-AARP-ppi-sec.pdf.
2. IMS Inst. for Healthcare Informatics, Medicines Use and Spending Shifts: A Review of
the Use of Medicines in the U.S. in 2014, at 3 (2015).
3. See Generic Pharm. Ass’ns, Generic Drug Savings in the U.S. 1 (6th ed. 2014),
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/GPhA_Savings_Report.9.10.14_FINAL.pdf.
4. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 740 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
5. FTC, FTC Authorized Generic Drugs Study 14546 (2011), http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission.
6. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, FTC, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry:
How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for
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cost ten times less than their brand-name counterparts. However, these
savings are lost when the brand-name pharmaceutical company settles
with the generic manufacturer in order to eliminate the risk of expensive
litigation that could ultimately invalidate its patent and open the door to
competition from generic drugs. By delaying the manufacture and sale of
a version of its drug, the brand-name company is able to maintain its
monopoly-set price and thus, make more than it and the generic
challenger would have made combined if they were to compete with each
other on the market. In an anticompetitive reverse payment settlement,
the generic company agrees to drop its application to produce a low-cost
generic version of the drug in exchange for a share of the monopolized
profits. In such a scenario, where the brand-name and generic drug
companies conspire to intentionally block competition, their actions
constitute an antitrust violation. Until FTC v. Actavis, Inc., it was unclear
whether all reverse payment settlements raised antitrust concerns.
For years, the federal circuit courts were split on whether reverse
8
payment settlements were illegal under antitrust law. This conflict was
finally resolved in Actavis, where the Supreme Court held that, although
reverse settlements in pharmaceutical patent infringement lawsuits
should not automatically be deemed illegal, some do violate antitrust
9
laws. The Court decided that reverse settlements should be reviewed on
a case-by-case basis, under the antitrust “rule of reason” standard, to
10
determine whether they violate antitrust law. However, following this
decision, a sub-issue has caused a divide in lower courts’ application of
Actavis. Specifically, district courts have come to inconsistent conclusions

Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution), Address Before the Center for American Progress 8
(June 23, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
pay-delay-settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conduct-protect/090
623payfordelayspeech.pdf).
7. See FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions 2 (2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-costconsumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
8. See infra Part II; see, e.g., In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 142206, at *60 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (holding that reverse payment settlements were
presumptively illegal); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (holding that reverse payment
settlements only violated antitrust law if they exceeded the exclusionary “scope of the patent,”
unlawfully extending the patent monopoly); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187,
21213 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (advocating the “scope of the patent” test
when reviewing reverse payment settlements for unlawful anticompetitive effect); In re Cardizem, CD
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that reverse payments were per se illegal).
9. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
10. Id. The rule of reason standard requires courts to weigh a settlement’s anticompetitive effects
against its procompetitive effects to determine if it violates antitrust law. See infra Part II.C for a
discussion of the rule of reason standard. This standard was first developed in Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States as a legal doctrine used to interpret the Sherman Act, the core of U.S. antitrust
policy. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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as to whether Actavis applies to reverse payments with nonmonetary
11
settlement terms, or if it is limited only to monetary exchanges. While
many courts have held that the term “reverse payment” is not limited to
12
monetary payment, other courts have dismissed cases because they
interpret Actavis to require cash consideration in order to trigger rule of
13
reason antitrust scrutiny.
This Note explains why reverse payment settlements should not be
limited to monetary terms and proposes a model for courts to apply
when determining whether the terms of a nonmonetary settlement
violate antitrust law. First, Part I summarizes the Hatch-Waxman Act
and its role in allowing reverse payment settlements and their
anticompetitive effects to exist. Next, Part II describes the pre-Actavis
circuit split over the proper antitrust analysis of reverse payment
settlements. Part III examines the facts and holding of Actavis, as well as
the rule of reason antitrust standard set forth by the Court. Part IV then
examines lower courts’ contrasting interpretations of whether Actavis
and its rule of reason antitrust scrutiny are limited to reverse payment
settlements involving an exchange of cash. Part V provides support for
the argument that Actavis’s rule of reason antitrust scrutiny should not
be limited to monetary settlements. Finally, Part VI proposes a formula
for applying the Actavis rule of reason analysis to determine whether a
particular nonmonetary settlement violates antitrust law.
I. The Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Role in Anticompetitive Reverse
Payment Settlements
In response to rising healthcare and pharmaceutical costs, Congress
enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”) to expedite the approval process of generic
drugs. This allows generics to quickly enter the market and reach
14
consumers once the patent on the brand-name drug expires. However,
since its passage, the Hatch-Waxman Act has unintentionally enabled
11. See United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F.
Supp. 3d 1052, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206,
at *60; In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 550 (D.N.J. 2014); In re Niaspan Antitrust
Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014); In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180
(D.R.I. 2014); In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231 (D. Mass. 2014).
12. See United Food, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1069; In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 751;
In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013).
13. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180; In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560 (D.N.J. 2014).
14. Jon Leibowitz, FTC, Second Annual In-House Counsel of Forum on Pharmaceutical
Antitrust: Exclusion Payments to Settle Pharmaceutical Patent Cases; They’re B-a-a-a-ck!
(2006); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
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pharmaceutical companies to enter into anticompetitive reverse
15
settlements. This negative consequence and the aspects of the HatchWaxman Act that contribute to it will be discussed after the following
summary of the approval process for generic drugs.
To begin the expedited approval process for their drug, potential
generic manufacturers file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) in which they assert that their generic drug is “bioequivalent” to
a brand-name drug that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
16
has already approved. This means that the generic drug contains the
17
same active ingredients as the brand-name drug. Because the drugs are
“bioequivalent,” the FDA can simply refer to the safety and efficacy
findings it previously made during the testing and approval process of the
18
brand-name drug when examining the ANDA-filer’s drug. By allowing
generics to bypass expensive and time-consuming drug trials, the ANDA’s
procedure accelerates the availability of low-cost generic drugs to
consumers.
To submit an ANDA, applicants must make one of four “paragraph
certifications” that their generic product will not infringe the brand19
name’s patents. The fourth option, the “paragraph IV certification,” is
20
the one involved in reverse settlement cases. Under a paragraph IV
certification, the ANDA applicant either asserts that the brand-name’s
patent is invalid or that the “manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic
21
drug will not infringe the patent. Once the generic manufacturer files an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, the brand-name patentee has
forty-five days to attempt to stop the generic from receiving FDA
approval by filing a patent infringement suit against the generic
22
company. This patent infringement suit triggers a thirty-month stay
during which the FDA will not approve the generic drug, and the two
23
parties litigate the validity or infringement of the patent.
To incentivize generic manufacturers to file paragraph IV ANDA
applications despite the risk of being sued for patent infringement, the
Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180-days of marketing exclusivity to the first
generic drug manufacturer to file a paragraph IV ANDA application
24
(the generic “first-filer”). During this period, the FDA will not approve
generic drug applications from any other company that would compete

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

FTC, supra note 5, at 139.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
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25

with the first generic manufacturer. Through this provision, the HatchWaxman Act benefits consumers by encouraging challenges to invalid
patents and the marketing of noninfringing generics, increasing the
availability of generic drugs and price competition among pharmaceutical
26
manufacturers.
However, in reverse payment settlements, the brand-name
pharmaceutical company “pays” the generic first-filer to stay off the
market until a specified date. In this scenario, the patentee essentially
pays the generic company to postpone its 180-day marketing exclusivity
period, allowing the brand-name manufacturer to stretch out its
monopoly period. Such arrangements are possible because of the
Medicare Modernization Amendments Act of 2003, under which the
generic first-filer’s exclusivity period is not triggered until the generic
27
product actually enters the market. In exchange for settling, the brandname company often agrees not to launch its own generic drug, which
would otherwise have competed with the generic first-filer’s product
28
during its marketing exclusivity period. This type of settlement
29
provision is called a “no-AG” agreement.
An “AG,” or “authorized generic,” is the brand-name manufacturer’s
own generic version of the patented drug. Although the Hatch-Waxman
Act prevents other generic companies from entering the market during
the first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period, it does not exclude the original
30
patentee from doing so. By releasing its own generic version of the
drug, the brand-name patentee is able to “recover some of the sales and
profits it would otherwise lose when a [generic first-filer] begins to
31
market and sell its generic.” For this reason, a no-AG agreement with
the brand-name company is a powerful incentive for a generic first-filer
to delay release of its generic drug. Studies have shown that competition
from the patentee’s AG generally reduces the generic company’s
32
revenues during its 180-day exclusivity period by about fifty percent.
Through their reverse payment settlement, the brand-name patentee and
the generic first-filer are both able to enhance their profits while
extending the period in which other generics are excluded from the
market.

25. Id.
26. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 74142 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
27. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
28. See FTC, supra note 5, at 14546.
29. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 567 (D.N.J. 2014).
30. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 741.
31. Id.
32. FTC, supra note 5, at 139.
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At this stage, the Hatch-Waxman Act plays a key role in the parties’
ability to engage in anticompetitive reverse payment settlements.
Because the generic first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period creates a
duopoly, the two parties can conspire together to set monopoly-level
33
prices without outside competition to hold them in check. Additionally,
because only the first generic company to file an ANDA is entitled to an
exclusivity period, other generic companies are less motivated to attempt
34
to enter the drug market before the patent’s expiration date. Although
they may believe that either the patent is invalid or their product does
not infringe the patent, other generic companies are unwilling to risk the
expense of litigation with the patentee without the incentive of the 18035
day exclusivity period. Therefore, the reverse payment settlement
essentially prevents not only the generic first-filer from entering the
market, but also all other generic companies from doing so, thus preserving
the brand-name company’s monopoly.
When the patentee and the generic challenger agree to a reverse
payment settlement, the brand-name manufacturer’s patent remains
36
intact, and the public does not get the benefit of price competition. This
harms consumers by slowing both generic entry into the marketplace and
the additional competition the AG could have provided during the
37
generic competitor’s 180-day exclusivity period. In order to prevent
pharmaceutical companies from taking advantage of the inadvertent
loophole in the Hatch-Waxman Act and attempting to unlawfully hinder
competition, it is imperative that suspicious reverse payment settlements
be examined for violations of antitrust law.
II. FTC V. ACTAVIS, INC.
In 2013, following years of debate and contrasting holdings in regard
to the legality of reverse payment settlements, the Supreme Court in
FTC v. Actavis, Inc. ruled that such settlements sometimes violate
antitrust law, and that they should be examined for unlawful
anticompetitive effect under the antitrust “rule of reason” standard of
38
analysis. However, Actavis failed to provide a framework for lower
courts to use when applying the rule of reason to evaluate reverse
payments for possible antitrust violations. As a result, lower courts have

33. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).
35. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey P. Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts
Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent
Litigation, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 65 (2010).
36. FTC, supra note 5, at 139.
37. Id.
38. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
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diverged greatly in their interpretations and applications of the Actavis
holding.
A. Pre-ACTAVIS Circuit Split on Whether Reverse Payment
Settlements Violated Antitrust Law
Prior to Actavis, there was a federal circuit split regarding the
legality of reverse payment settlements. On one side of split, the Sixth
39
Circuit held that reverse payments were “per se illegal,” and the Third
Circuit decided that such settlements were “prima facie evidence of an
40
unreasonable restraint on trade.” The Third Circuit held that the
defendant has the burden of proving that the patentee’s “payment
(1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro41
competitive benefit.” On the other side, the Second and Eleventh
Circuits, along with the Federal Circuit, adopted a “scope of the patent”
42
test. Under this test, reverse payment settlements only violate antitrust
43
law if they exceed the exclusionary “scope of the patent,” by extending
44
the patent monopoly. This split was finally resolved in Actavis, where
the Court held that reverse payment settlements are not automatically
unlawful and should be examined under the antitrust “rule of reason
45
test.”
B. FTC V. ACTAVIS, INC.
In Actavis, the FTC brought suit against four pharmaceutical
companies, alleging that they had “violated the antitrust laws” by
conspiring in restrain of trade to maintain monopoly-set drug prices and
46
share the profits at the expense of consumers. Specifically, the FTC
challenged a reverse payment settlement where the patentee
pharmaceutical company, Solvay, paid several hundred million dollars to
three generic companies—Paddock, Par, and Actavis—to delay marketing
39. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 90506 (6th Cir. 2003).
40. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
41. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 218.
42. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F. 3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated
by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (rejecting the scope-of-the-patent test); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 21213 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223; FTC v. Watson
Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
43. Under the “scope of the patent” test, there is no anticompetitve effect in violation of antitrust
law as long as competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent. In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litig., 686 F.3d at 212. In other words, the agreements only violate antitrust law if they “restrict
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.” Id. at 214 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F. 3d at 1336).
44. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 21213, abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
45. See infra Part II.B.
46. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. The FTC is the government entity in charge of protecting
consumers from anticompetitive business practices in the marketplace.
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their generic versions of Solvay’s drug AndroGel for approximately nine
47
years. The FTC argued that by “unlawfully agreeing ‘to share in
Solvay’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and refrain
from launching their low-cost generic products to compete with
AndroGel for nine years,’” the settling parties had violated § 5 of the
48
Federal Trade Commission Act.
Under its settlement with Solvay, Actavis agreed not to release its
generic until sixty-five months prior to Solvay’s patent expiration date,
49
unless another party marketed a generic before that date. Additionally,
50
Actavis would promote Solvay’s AndroGel to physicians. In return,
Solvay, the patentee, paid $12 million to Paddock, $60 million to Par, and
51
$19 million to $30 million to Actavis for the next nine years.
Applying the “scope of the patent” test, the Eleventh Circuit
52
dismissed the complaint. It concluded that the settlement was “immune
from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the
53
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.” On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s decision,
establishing the “rule of reason” as the standard to be used when
determining if a reverse payment settlement restricts competition in
54
violation of antitrust law. In doing so, the Court held that “there is
reason for concern that settlements taking this form tend to have
55
significant adverse effects on competition.” However, the Court also
noted that reverse, or “pay-for-delay,” settlements in pharmaceutical
patent infringement litigation cannot automatically be deemed
56
anticompetitive and illegal. Rather, reverse settlements must be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis and under the antitrust “rule of reason”
57
standard. Under the rule of reason standard, courts should evaluate

47. Id. at 2229.
48. Id. at 222930.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2224 (citing FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1289, 1312 (2012)).
53. Id. at 2230 (quoting Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312).
54. See, e.g., id. at 2231 (reversing Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of FTC’s complaint). The Eleventh
Circuit had initially reviewed the complaint under the scope-of-the-patent test. Watson Pharms., Inc.,
677 F.3d at 1312. However, following the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Eleventh Circuit will reexamine
the case under the rule of reason test. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.
55. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238.
56. Id. at 2237.
57. Id. at 223738. The rule of reason is a judge-made doctrine that was first developed in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States and used to interpret the Sherman Antitrust Act that was
first developed. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). However, since Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, it has
been deemed the customary standard by which courts ascertain whether conduct violates the Sherman
Act. 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911).
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both the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of these settlements
58
in a balancing test to determine if it violates antitrust law.
C. Rule of Reason Analysis
According to the Court in Actavis, district courts should administer
a three-part test when examining a reverse payment settlement for
anticompetitive effect: (1) determine if there was a reverse payment;
(2) determine if that payment was “large and unjustified;” and (3) apply
59
the rule of reason. Not all reverse payments require scrutiny for
antitrust violations under the rule of reason. Rather, “the likelihood of a
reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its
size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs,
its independence from other services for which it might represent
60
payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.” In other
words, only settlements that are both “reverse” and “large and
unjustified” need to be examined under the rule of reason. Then, if the
settlement’s anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive ones,
the settlement likely violated antitrust law, and the FTC is allowed to
61
pursue an antitrust claim against the settling parties.
The Actavis Court laid out five factors to guide lower courts’
analyses when applying the rule of reason and weighing a settlement’s
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects: (1) whether the consideration at
issue has the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition;”
(2) whether these anticompetitive consequences will “at least sometimes” be
“unjustified”; (3) whether the reverse payment “threat[ens] to work
unjustified anticompetitive harm”; (4) whether an antitrust action is
administratively feasible; and (5) the parties’ reasons for preferring
62
“settlements that include reverse payments.” Courts should consider
each of these factors carefully when determining whether a settlement
has an overall anticompetitive impact or a procompetitive one. The
following is a detailed explanation of each of the five factors, including
examples of the analysis that should go into each of them.
1.

Whether the Consideration at Issue Has the “Potential for
Genuine Adverse Effects on Competition”

First, a district court examining a reverse settlement should
determine whether the settlement terms have the “potential for genuine

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 223738.
Id.
Id. at 2234.
Id. at 223437.
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63

adverse effects on competition.” For example, reverse payments that
encourage generic challengers to drop viable claims of patent invalidity
or non-infringement, and thus delay launching their generic products,
64
have “a genuine adverse effect on competition.” This is because
settlements with reverse payments postpone consumer access to lower
priced generic drugs by an average of seventeen months longer than
65
patent infringement settlements without such payments. These reverse
payments allow the patentee to maintain the same high price for its
pharmaceutical by keeping generic competitors off the market. The
patentee is essentially dividing its monopoly profits with the generic
challenger. As a result, both settling parties earn more than they would
have made competing with each other on the market. All of this is
ultimately at the expense of consumers, raising the cost of life-saving
medication and preventing a diversity of options.
2.

Whether Anticompetitive Consequences Will “at Least
Sometimes” Prove Unjustified

Second, district courts should ask whether there are justifications for
the anticompetitive consequences of the agreement. For example, a
payment may be justified if it equals the approximate litigation costs
avoided by settlement, along with “compensation for other services the
66
generic has promised to perform.” Other possible justifications, which
will be further examined in Part IV of this Note, include demonstrating
that the settlement increased product output, decreased product price, or
67
increased consumer choice. The settlement may also be justified if the
generic manufacturer was financially unable to produce and market its
68
generic drug without the reverse payment it received from the patentee.
3.

Whether the Reverse Payment Threatens to Bring About
“Unjustified Anticompetitive Harm”

Third, district courts should examine whether the patentee has the
market power to bring about the anticompetitive harm. Paying large
settlements to convince others to stay out of the market strongly suggests
that the brand-name drug manufacturer has the market power to create
anticompetitive harm by “charg[ing] prices higher than the competitive
69
level.” The likelihood of the reverse settlement causing anticompetitive
harm depends on “its size, its scale in relation to the [settling patentee’s]

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 2234 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 46061 (1986)).
Id.
FTC, supra note 7, at 4.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 223536.
See infra Part IV.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
Id. at 2236.
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anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services
for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other
70
convincing justification.”
4.

Whether an Antitrust Action Is Administratively Feasible

Fourth, the district court should examine whether the settlement is
71
so large that it implies the patent is weak. “Unexplained large reverse
payments” might indicate that the patentee has “serious doubts” that the
patent is strong enough to survive litigation and an examination of its
72
validity. This in turn suggests that the patentee’s motive for settling with
the generic company was purely to eliminate the risk of losing its patentcreated monopoly and encountering generic competition, thereby
73
preserving its ability to “maintain supracompetitive prices.” These are
unjustified motives for setting that raise antitrust concerns.
5.

The Parties’ Reasons for Preferring “Settlements That Include
Reverse Payments”

The fifth factor involves the district courts’ examination of whether
the parties could have settled in a way that did not involve the use of a
74
reverse payment, as well as why they preferred a reverse settlement. If
their motive in choosing such a settlement was to “maintain and to share
patent-generated monopoly profits, then, in the absence of some other
75
justification,” their settlement raises antitrust concerns.
Essentially, reverse payment settlements must be reviewed on a
76
case-by-case basis, under the antitrust rule of reason standard. Under a
rule of reason analysis, courts must evaluate both the procompetitive and
77
anticompetitive effects of these settlements. Although the Actavis Court
provided five factors to consider when examining reverse payment
settlements, it declined to create a specific framework for the rule of
reason analysis. Instead, the Court left it to the lower courts to
78
establish. Since Actavis, courts have largely varied in their application of

70. Id.
71. Id.; see also In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206,
at *60 (D.N.J. 2014).
72. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *60.
75. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
76. Id. at 223738.
77. See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical
Patent Litigation, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 6263 (2010).
78. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (holding that “the structuring of the present rule-of-reason
antitrust litigation” would be left “to the lower courts”).
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the holding to the reverse payment settlements before them. For
instance, some district courts have held that reverse payment scrutiny is
limited to exchanges of monetary consideration, whereas others have
79
disagreed. Furthermore, while many courts do agree that nonmonetary
settlements are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under Actavis, they
diverge in their application of the rule of reason test. This Note’s
proposal seeks to address these remaining post-Actavis uncertainties.
III. Post-ACTAVIS Circuit Split
District courts have come to varying conclusions about whether
Actavis extends antitrust scrutiny to noncash reverse payment
80
settlements, or if the holding only applies to monetary settlement terms.
Most courts have held that Actavis should be applied broadly to include
81
nonmonetary settlements. However, other courts have dismissed
antitrust lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies on the grounds that
reverse payment settlements devoid of a monetary exchange are not
82
reverse payments. This discrepancy in the interpretation and application of
Actavis is evident in the following cases.
In In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litigation, the District of Rhode
Island dismissed an antitrust lawsuit because it determined that Actavis
83
only applied to monetary settlements. The settlement at issue in this
case involved the generic manufacturer’s agreement to delay launching
its generic drug until six months before the patent expiration date, in
exchange for the brand-name manufacturer’s agreement to: (1) not
launch its AG within the generic manufacturer’s 180 days of exclusivity;
(2) not license other generics during that exclusivity period; (3) grant the
generic company a license to market the generic worldwide, starting
during that period; (4) pay the generic manufacturer annual fees and a

79. Cf. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 569 (D.N.J. 2014) (“It
is good jurisprudence that the result flows from the factual source; this Court will not extend the
holding of Actavis to the non-monetary facts before it.”); cf. In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust
Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013) (“This Court does not see fit to read into the opinion a
strict limitation of its principles to monetary-based arrangements alone. Adopting a broader
interpretation of the word ‘payment,’ on the other hand, serves the purpose of aligning the law with
modern-day realities.”).
80. See Table 1 infra for a summary of the circuit split that has occurred following the Actavis
decision.
81. See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., No. 12-MD-02409, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17718, at *17 (D. Mass. Feb. 12, 2014) (declining to limit the principles in Actavis to monetary
based arrangements); In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 741 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding
that term “reverse payment” is not limited to cash payment).
82. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 182 (D.R.I. 2014) (holding
that Actavis requires cash consideration in order to trigger rule of reason scrutiny); In re Lamictal
Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 Supp. 3d at 56970 (holding that the Supreme Court in Actavis
considered reverse payment to be limited to an exchange of money).
83. See In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 19293.
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percentage of net sales in connection with the co-promotion of a separate
drug produced by the patentee; and (5) give the generic manufacturer
84
the exclusive right to earn brand sales of a separate drug. In granting
the defendant settling parties’ motion to dismiss, the court interpreted
Actavis to require actual “cash payment” in order for a reverse payment
settlement to trigger rule of reason scrutiny and potentially violate
85
antitrust law. The court held that because the plaintiffs failed to
“adequately allege[] payment in the form of cash, . . . [they] failed to
86
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Further explaining its
reasoning, the court stated that if the Supreme Court had intended for
Actavis to apply to nonmonetary settlements, “it could simply have said
so,” but instead the Court consciously chose to focus solely on cash
settlements, with “cash-focused guidance for applying the rule of
87
reason.”
In contrast, in United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v.
Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
88
that Actavis does apply to nonmonetary reverse settlement terms. The
United Food court did not find the District of Rhode Island’s reasoning
persuasive, especially with regard to that court’s conclusion that Actavis
does not apply to nonmonetary settlements because they are “almost
89
impossible to measure.” Challenging this assertion, the court explained
that the monetary value of no-AG agreements could be estimated as the
difference between the generic’s “projected revenues with the agreement”
and their “projected revenues had they competed with the pioneer’s
90
authorized generic” (that is, without the no-AG agreement). Therefore,
the court reasoned that these complaints should not be dismissed merely
because the reverse payment settlements involved nonmonetary terms,
91
and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Many courts argue that restricting the application of Actavis to only
cash settlements will allow pharmaceutical patentees to shield payments
for delayed generic entry from antitrust scrutiny simply by settling in
92
nonmonetary terms. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re
Niaspan Antitrust Litigation noted that such limitations on Actavis would

84. Id. at 186.
85. Id. at 19293.
86. Id. at 195.
87. Id. at 192.
88. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp.
3d 1052, 106970 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
89. Id. at 1069.
90. Id. at 1071.
91. Id. at 107172. See infra Part VII for further discussion on the conversion of noncash
settlements to monetary values.
92. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
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permit settling parties to “cloak reverse payments . . . under the guise of
compensating” for such terms as co-promotion and manufacturing
agreements, to ensure the challenger does not market a generic version
93
of their drug or challenge the validity of their patents. This would allow
the patentee to surreptitiously, yet unlawfully, maintain its monopoly-set
prices at the expense of consumers—the very scenario Actavis was trying
to prevent.
Meanwhile, reaching a compromise between the two views, other
courts have held that plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive conduct by the
two settling parties must convert the noncash terms into a monetary
94
value before examining the settlement for anticompetitive effect. For
example, the District of New Jersey dismissed the suit in In re Lipitor
Antitrust Litigation because the plaintiffs had failed to provide a reliable
95
estimate of the values of the nonmonetary settlement terms. Although
Actavis never explicitly stated that reverse payments were limited to
96
cash, the Court did emphasize monetary payments in its holding.
Therefore, some courts assert that when applying Actavis to analyze a
settlement, the nonmonetary payment should be converted to a “reliable
estimate of its monetary value,” so that courts can analyze it using the
97
Actavis factors.
Despite its apparent focus on monetary settlements in its decision, it
seems unlikely that the Actavis Court intended its holding to only apply
to monetary reverse payments to the exclusion of nonmonetary settlement
terms. Restricting antitrust scrutiny to solely monetary settlements would
hinder Actavis from fully achieving the Court’s goal of protecting
consumers from the higher drug prices that result from these
anticompetitive business practices. If the holding of Actavis does not
apply to nonmonetary reverse payment settlements, then pharmaceutical
companies can escape liability for antitrust violations simply by
structuring their settlements to avoid monetary terms. Therefore, it is
important that the reverse payment scrutiny be extended to nonmonetary
settlement terms as well as to monetary ones.

93. Id. at 752.
94. See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *62
(D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 550 (D.N.J. 2014).
95. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
96. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 223536 (2013).
97. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *62.
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Table 1: Summary of Post-ACTAVIS Circuit Split
District

Reverse Payment
Settlement

Decision

In re
98
Effexor

D.N.J.

No-AG agreement

The case was dismissed in
part.

In re
99
Lipitor

D.N.J.

Case

In re
Lamictal
101

In re
102
Nexium

D.N.J.

D. Mass.

100

Side deals

No-AG agreement
No-AG agreement
103

and side deals

No-AG agreement,

The case was dismissed
because the complaint must
include reliable cash value of
nonmonetary payment.
The case was dismissed
but is now on appeal in the
Third Circuit.
The defendants’ motions
for summary judgment
were granted in part and
denied in part.

Holding Regarding
Nonmonetary
Settlement Terms
Plaintiffs bringing
the complaint must
convert noncash terms
into a monetary value.
Plaintiffs bringing
the complaint must
convert noncash terms
into a monetary value.
Actavis is limited to
monetary-based
settlements.
Actavis applies to
nonmonetary
settlements.

The case was dismissed
but is now on appeal in the
First Circuit.

Actavis is limited to
monetary-based
settlements.

No-AG agreement,
co-promotion, and
side deals

The defendants’ motions
to dismiss were partially
denied.

Actavis applies to
nonmonetary
settlements.

N.D. Cal.

No-AG agreement
and $96 million in
free product

The defendants’ motion
to dismiss was denied.

Actavis applies to
nonmonetary
settlements.

E.D. Pa.

Cash payment, no-AG
agreement, Supply and
co-promotion
agreements

The defendants’ motion to
dismiss on grounds that term
“reverse payment” is limited to
cash payments was denied.

Actavis applies to
nonmonetary
settlements.

105

In re
104
Loestrin

D.R.I.

In re
Aggrenox
Antitrust
106
Litig.

D.
Conn.

United
107
Food
In re
108
Niaspan

side deals, and
licenses to the
generic manufacturer

98. Id.
99. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523.
100. The side deals in Lipitor included overseas licensing rights and settlement of overseas
litigation, as well as litigation concerning a separate product unrelated to the underlying patent. Id. at
54142.
101. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 18 F. Supp. 3d 560 (D.N.J. 2014).
102. In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231 (2014).
103. The side deals in In re Nexium included: (1) “Distribution Agreements,” under which the
generic company would distribute authorized generic versions of other drugs owned by the patentee;
(2) an agreement under which the generic company would store some of the patentee’s products; (3) a
“Supply Agreement,” under which the generic company would provide the patentee with supplies of
the “active pharmaceutical ingredient” in the patented drug; and (4) an agreement by the generic to
supply the patentee with quantities of the patented pharmaceutical drug. Id. at 26162.
104. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180 (D.R.I. 2014).
105. The side deals in In re Loestrin included a promise not to license other generics for a certain
period and licenses and co-promotion agreements involving other drugs owned by the brand-name
company that were not related to the underlying patent. Id. at 186.
106. In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-MD-2516, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35634 (D. Conn.
Mar. 23, 2015).
107. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp.
3d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
108. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
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IV. Reverse Settlement Scrutiny Should Not Be Limited to
Monetary Settlements
Since Actavis the question of whether the Court intended its holding
to apply solely to monetary reverse payments, or to all forms of reverse
payment settlements, including nonmonetary ones, has been strongly
debated. This Part argues that the holding of Actavis should also apply to
nonmonetary settlement terms, since such terms are just as capable of
producing anticompetitive effects as monetary ones by persuading
generic companies to drop their patent challenges and keep their lower
priced drugs off the market.
Another reason antitrust scrutiny should extend to nonmonetary
agreements is that pharmaceutical companies are increasingly
109
incorporating noncash terms into their settlements. The FTC has
reported that the frequency of nonmonetary terms, such as no110
in reverse payment
authorized-generic (“No-AG”) provisions,
settlements is growing. Illustrating this point, in 2012, nineteen out of
111
forty potential reverse payment settlements included a no-AG agreement.
This means that nearly half of all reverse payment settlements in 2012
incorporated the most popular nonmonetary term. If Actavis is only
applied to monetary reverse payment settlements, at least half of all
pharmaceutical reverse settlements will escape antitrust scrutiny.
In response to the rising settlement trend involving nonmonetary
terms, many district courts have held that reverse payment scrutiny
112
should not be limited to monetary exchanges. Rather, it should be
broadly applied to include “anything of value to the generic that can
113
induce it to ‘give up the patent fight’” and delay launching its product.
Following this perspective, settlement provisions such as no-AG
agreements should qualify as “reverse payments” because they have
114
“tremendous value to the generic manufacturer.” The generic’s 180day marketplace exclusivity that no-AG agreements protect can be
115
worth “several hundred million dollars” to the generic company.

109. In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d at 19394.
110. FTC, supra note 5, at 2.
111. Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission Under
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of
Agreements Filed in FY 2012, at 1 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/
130117mmareport.pdf.
112. See In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting FTC v.
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 223536 (2013)).
113. Id.; see also Payments, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “payments” as
“performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in
partial or full discharge of the obligation”).
114. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 750.
115. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
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Meanwhile, brand-name manufacturers could enhance their own profits
by six percent to twenty-one percent during the 180-day exclusivity
period by marketing their own AG—that is, if they do not enter a no-AG
116
agreement with the generic company. Indeed, many of these settlement
117
terms work “exactly as would a payment of cash.” Similarly to other
anticompetitive strategies, no-AG provisions lead generic manufacturers
to “agree to a later entry date than [they] would otherwise agree to in
118
order to settle a patent-infringement case.” Therefore, it seems logical
to extend antitrust scrutiny to these types of nonmonetary terms.
In considering whether Actavis applies to nonmonetary payments or
is restricted to only cash settlements, it is important to note that the
Supreme Court’s main concern when deciding the case was whether
119
there were “genuine adverse effects on competition.” As explained
earlier, nonmonetary terms often perform the same function as monetary
terms, incentivizing generic companies to drop their patent validity
challenges and agree to delay launching their generic drugs. If Actavis is
only applied to monetary settlements, pharmaceutical companies can
engage in anticompetitive activity yet escape antitrust liability simply by
120
disguising their conduct under the shield of nonmonetary settlements.
It is especially important to expand antitrust scrutiny to nonmonetary
agreements because pharmaceutical patent settlements are increasingly
taking on “unconventional, noncash forms,” in a surreptitious attempt to
121
escape antitrust scrutiny. Therefore, both monetary and nonmonetary
reverse payment settlements should be reviewed under Actavis for
unlawful restraints on competition.
V. Determining Whether Nonmonetary Settlement Terms
Violate Antitrust Law
To provide guidance for how courts should determine whether a
nonmonetary reverse payment settlement’s terms violate antitrust law,
122
this Note proposes the following four-step model of analysis. First, the
plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive activity (generally, the FTC, consumers
of the involved pharmaceutical drug, or other interested parties) must

116. FTC, supra note 5, at 62.
117. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 752.
118. Id.
119. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
120. See, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 193 (D.R.I. 2014) (holding
that in limiting Actavis to cash payments, pharmaceutical companies “are likely to evade Sherman Act
scrutiny so long as [they] take the obvious care to structure their settlements in ways that avoid cash
payments”).
121. Id. at 19394; see also FTC, supra note 5, at 14546 (concluding that no-AG agreements are
increasingly common as “compensation to generics for restrictions on entry”).
122. See supra Figure I.
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calculate the monetary value of all noncash settlement terms. Second,
the plaintiffs must approximate the litigation costs the patentee and
124
generic challenger avoided by settling. Under this Note’s proposed
standard, if the reverse payment value is less than or equal to the avoided
litigation costs, then the reverse settlement would escape further
antitrust scrutiny and the complaint should be dismissed. However, if the
settlement value exceeds the avoided litigation costs, then the burden
shifts to the settling parties—that is, the brand-name patentee and the
generic ANDA filer—to prove that the large payment is justified, either
125
provided to the patentee by the generic
by “other services”
126
manufacturer or other “valid, reasonable justifications.”
If the settlement included payment for other services conferred by
the generic challenger, such as supplying the patentee with raw materials
to manufacture its drugs, or serving as a back-up supplier for the brandname company’s products, then the defendants must show that the value
of these services makes up for the discrepancy between the reverse
payment and the avoided litigation costs. This is the third step of this
Note’s proposed model of analysis. In rebuttal, the plaintiffs may provide
evidence that the generic services in the agreement were not actually
rendered, or that the payment exceeded the market value of those
services, thus suggesting that these settlement terms were made merely
as a cover for unlawful reverse payments in an attempt to restrict
competition.
If the monetary value of the reverse payment is approximately equal
to the sum of the avoided litigation costs and the market value of services
actually provided by the generic manufacturer, the settlement should
escape further examination and the complaint should be dismissed.
However, if the payment greatly exceeds the market value of what the
brand-name company truly received, the two settling parties have the
burden of either: (1) proving that their settlement terms are justified; or
(2) demonstrating that the patentee pharmaceutical company had a high
likelihood of prevailing in the underlying infringement lawsuit. This is
the fourth and final step of this Note’s proposed model of analysis. If the
settling defendants are unable to meet their burden on either alternative,
their settlement will be deemed anticompetitive and therefore, in violation
127
of antitrust law.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
See infra Part V.D.
See infra Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Proposed Model for Applying ACTAVIS to
Nonmonetary Reverse Payments

A. Step 1: The Plaintiffs Must Calculate the Monetary Value of
All Noncash Settlement Terms.
Under this proposed model, the plaintiffs, that is, the parties
alleging the anticompetitive behavior between the settling patentee and
generic manufacturer have the burden of first determining the value of
each nonmonetary settlement term in the agreement at issue. This step is
crucial because it will allow the court to later decide if the reverse
payment was “large and unjustified,” and thus carried “the risk of
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128

significant anticompetitive effects.” The plaintiffs must include these
settlement term values, as well as a reliable foundation that supports
these particular values, in the complaint. If the plaintiffs are unable to
fulfill their burden, the suit cannot move forward. The reason for this is
that without reliable values, the court is unable to determine whether the
settlement truly was “large and unjustified,” as well as whether it was
“reverse.” Indeed, many post-Actavis courts have agreed that all noncash
terms must be converted to a monetary value in order to enable proper
129
analysis of reverse payment settlements.
When bringing their complaint, plaintiffs must calculate the value of
all consideration the alleged generic infringer received as part of the
settlement. This consideration may include such nonmonetary terms as
forgiving a debt (such as damages from a separate patent infringement
case for a different patent involving the same two parties), no-AG
agreements (the most common noncash settlement term), granting rights
in foreign markets, early entry (that is, delaying marketing of the generic
while still allowing marketplace entry prior to the patent expiration
date), and payment for unrelated services supposedly provided by the
generic company.
When estimating the value of a nonmonetary agreement term, the
plaintiffs must produce a “reliable foundation supporting that value,”
including an explanation of how they had calculated the payment
130
value. One example of a case dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to
131
fulfill this burden is In re Effexor XR Antritrust Litigation. In this case,
the plaintiffs calculated the settlement as the sum of the values of an
eleven-month no-AG agreement and an allowed generic entry date prior
to the patent expiration date, minus the sum of the avoided litigation
costs and the royalties the generic challenger would pay the brand-name
manufacturer during its eleven months of exclusivityin other words,
132
the duration of the eleven-month no-AG agreement. However, the
court dismissed the antitrust violation claim because the plaintiffs had
not adequately established a reliable foundation that supported the
133
settlement values that their complaint relied on. Without reliable
values, the court could not determine the direction of the payment,

128. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
129. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc.,
74 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that in order to decide whether a term is a “large
and unjustified payment,” courts “must be able to calculate its value”); see also In re Effexor XR
Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479 2014, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *66 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014) (holding that
“when an alleged reverse payment involves” nonmonetary terms, it “must be valued in terms of a
monetary amount in order to determine if it is ‘large’ within the meaning of Actavis”).
130. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *69.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *71.
133. Id. at *7173.
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meaning whether the net value was directed in “reverse,” toward the
generic manufacturer, or whether the settlement value was “large” and
134
“unexplained.”
In another example, the settlement in United Food & Commercial
Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc. involved the brandname company giving the generic manufacturer $96 million in brand
product, as well as agreeing to not launch its own authorized generic
135
drug during the generic company’s 180-day exclusivity period. Because
the agreement “plausibly incentivized [the generic challenger] to accept
an entry date later than it otherwise would have—which is precisely the
harm that Actavis sought to prevent,” the court held that the no-AG
136
agreement had value. Indeed, a no-AG agreement is very valuable to
generic manufacturers because the “vast majority of [their] potential
137
profits . . . materialize during the 180-day exclusivity period.”
The value of a no-AG agreement, the most common noncash
settlement term, should be estimated as the difference between the
generics’ “projected revenues with the no-AG agreement” and their
“projected revenues had they competed with the pioneer’s authorized
138
generic” (that is, without the no-AG agreement). To calculate this
latter value, the plaintiffs must determine both the market share
percentage that the brand-name company would lose to the generic
company upon generic entry and the “retail price of generic drugs during
180-day exclusivity periods, with and without the presence of an AG on
139
the market.” According to a recent FDA study, the first generic to hit
the market can “capture [eighty percent] of the brand-name’s market
140
share” and sell at ninety percent of the brand-name’s price. However,
the availability of a second generic, such as an AG, results in the first
generic only capturing around forty percent of the market, and lowers
141
the [generic] drug’s price to fifty-two percent of the brand-name’s.”
Using such data, plaintiffs can calculate a reliable estimate of the value of
the no-AG agreement at issue, as well as that of any other nonmonetary
settlement terms. Once the plaintiff determines the monetary value of

134. Id.
135. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp.
3d 1052, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
136. Id. at 1074.
137. Letter from Kathleen Jaegar, President & CEO, Generic Pharm. Ass’n, to Donald S. Clark,
Sec’y of the Comm’n of FTC 2 (June 27, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_comments/2006/06/062806gpha.pdf.
138. United Food, 74 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.
139. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at *71.
140. Id. at *12.
141. FTC, supra note 5, at 58; see also Carl W. Hittinger & M. Mitchell Oates, ‘Actavis’ Still
Raising More Questions Than It Answers, Legal Intelligencer, May 4, 2015, at 3.
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each settlement term and presents a reliable foundation for these values,
they must then determine the avoided litigation costs.
B. Step 2: The Plaintiffs Must Determine the Avoided Litigation
Costs.
Litigation costs avoided by the settlement must be factored into this
analysis because they provide a justifiable motive for the reverse
payment. These expenses include fees of outside and local counsel,
exhibit preparation, analytical testing, expert witnesses, paralegal services,
142
fees for court reporters, and jury advisors. According to a recent survey
of intellectual property litigation costs, patent litigation costs an average
of $2.8 million when there is $1 million to $25 million in controversy and
143
$6 million where there is more than $25 million at issue. While the
144
median cost of patent litigation is $4.5 million, patentees often spend
145
more than this median amount when trying to uphold their patents.
Additionally, patent infringement litigation can cost generic companies
146
“as much as $10 million per suit.”
Upon receiving the complaint, the court should compare the
estimated avoided litigation costs against the total value of the reverse
payment, both of which will be acquired from reliable sources and
included in the complaint by the plaintiffs. Under this proposed test, if
the reverse payment value is less than or equal to the avoided litigation
costs, the settlement will escape further judicial scrutiny and the
complaint will be dismissed. The reason for this is that an attempt to
avoid incurring additional legal fees associated with ongoing litigation is
a well-founded reason for settling a lawsuit. However, if the settlement
value exceeds the avoided litigation costs, this suggests that the parties’
motives for settling were not legitimate, but instead a bribe by the brandname company to the generic manufacturer, to delay marketing its
generic drug. Therefore, the burden then shifts to the settling parties
(that is, the patentee pharmaceutical company and the generic
manufacturer) to prove that the large payment is justified by “other
services” provided to the patentee by the generic manufacturer.

142. Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey 34 (2013).
143. Id.
144. In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d, 523, 546 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing C. Scott Hamphill,
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, N.Y.U L. Rev.
1553, 1623 n.89 (2006)).
145. Id.
146. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 224344 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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C. Step 3: The Defendants Must Ascertain the Value of “Other
Services” Provided by the Alleged Generic Infringer to the
Patentee.
The Actavis Court held that payments are “justified” when they
reflect “traditional settlement considerations,” such as “avoided
litigation costs or fair value for services” provided to the brand-name
147
company by the generic challenger. Thus, the next step is to calculate
the market value of services rendered by the generic company and to
compare that amount to any discrepancy between the total value of the
reverse payment settlement and the avoided litigation costs. The settling
parties have the burden of calculating this amount and showing that the
value of the “other services” provided by the generic company makes up
for the difference between the values of the reverse payment and
avoided litigation costs. Examples of other services that generic
companies might provide include: supplying the patentee with raw
materials or finished pharmaceuticals, helping to promote the brandname manufacturer’s products (to doctors), and serving as a ready
148
Other
backup supplier for the brand-name company’s products.
payments may also include development fees for unrelated products that
149
the generic will produce for the patentee.
However, when determining the value of “other services” included
in the settlement, only the market values of those services that were
actually provided, versus merely promised but not performed, should be
considered. Additionally, this appraisal should be based on the fair
market value of the services rendered. These distinctions are important
because the FTC has reported settlements where some of the services
agreed upon were not actually provided, or the amount paid to the
generic company far exceeded the market value of the products and
150
services it had supplied to the brand-name company. This implies that
the payments were not truly for those listed products and services, but
rather for the generic company’s agreement to stay out of the
marketplace. The settling parties included the generic services in their
agreement merely as an attempt to shield their unlawful anticompetitive
behavior.
Yet, even when the defendants do produce evidence that the fair
market value of the generic company’s “other services” make up for the
price discrepancy, the plaintiffs may submit evidence of their own to
147. Id. at 2237.
148. Bureau of Competition, FTC, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Summary
of Agreements Filed in FY 2006, at 45 (2007).
149. Id.
150. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 106061 (2003).

Aoki_17 (Hamilton_12.15) (Do Not Delete)

December 2015]

THE PROBLEM WITH REVERSE PAYMENTS

12/15/2015 6:05 PM

285

rebut it, attacking the necessity of those services. Considering the
necessity of the generic’s services will help the court determine whether
the settlements are legitimate agreements or were entered into merely to
keep competing generic products off the market and maintain the
151
patentee’s monopoly. Evidence indicating a lack of necessity may
include the patentee’s failure to request sales projections or reports from
the generic, or the patentee’s lack of concern when the generic suspends
152
work on the project. Side deals that are “expressly contingent” on the
generic staying off the market also raise suspicions of anticompetitive
153
intent. However, evidence that the brand-name company had already
been “seeking this type of business opportunity” prior to the settlement
suggests that the side deal was necessary, and thus weighs in favor of the
154
settling parties. Such evidence might include internal documents from
before the settlement date, in which the brand-name company discussed
155
pursuing similar services. The court should take all evidence related to
the side deals’ necessities into consideration when determining if the
services make up for the difference between the value of the reverse
payment and the avoided litigation costs.
In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation presents an example of a reverse
payment settlement that involved suspicious side deals. In the settlement,
the brand-name manufacturer paid the generic challenger to co-promote
two drugs to women’s health doctors and serve as a ready back-up
156
supplier. However, the settlement also required the generic to delay
157
marketing its drug until a specified date. The In re Niaspan court
agreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the settlement was unlawful
158
given three critical findings. First, the brand-name manufacturer did
159
not need the standby services of the generic manufacturer. Second, the
Co-Promotion Agreement required the patentee to pay royalties based
on a percentage of all sales of Niaspan and Advicor, even though the
generic company was only promoting the products to women’s health
160
doctors. Finally, the standby payment far exceeded the value the
161
generic company was providing as a ready-to-manufacture supplier.
Even more indicative of anticompetitive behavior, each term in the

151. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 753 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
152. In re Schering-Plough. Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 1051.
153. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 753; see also Hittinger & Oates, supra note
141, at 23.
154. Hittinger & Oates, supra note 141, at 2.
155. Id.
156. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d at 744.
157. Id. at 745.
158. Id. at 752.
159. Id. at 75253.
160. Id. at 753.
161. Id.
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agreement was “expressly contingent on the generic manufacturer’s
162
promise to delay generic entry.” For all these reasons, the In re
Niaspan court held that the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged the existence
of a reverse payment for delayed entry with no legitimate procompetitive
justification,” and that “but for the anticompetitive settlement
agreements, the generic manufacturer would have prevailed in the
163
underlying patent litigation against the patentee.” In other words, the
settling parties in In re Niaspan had failed to meet their burden of
showing that the market value of “other services” provided by the
generic company made up for the discrepancy between the values of the
reverse payment and avoided litigation costs. Therefore, their motion to
164
dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint against them was denied.
However, if the settling parties are able to fulfill their burden of
proving that the value of “other services” provided by the generic makes
up for the discrepancy between the reverse payment and avoided
litigation costs, unlike the defendants in In re Niaspan, the burden shifts
to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs must then demonstrate that the generic
services were not actually provided, were not truly needed by the
patentee, or were overpaid for based on their market value. If the
plaintiffs satisfy this burden, the defendants must then prove “valid
justifications” for their settlement terms.
D. Step 4: Defendants’ Burden of Proving “Valid, Convincing
Justifications” for Their Settlement Terms
If the value of the reverse payment exceeds the combined value of
avoided litigation costs and services provided by the generic company,
the settling parties have one last chance to prove that their settlement
terms are justified. Alternatively, they could justify their settlement by
showing that the patentee had a high likelihood of prevailing in the
underlying patent infringement lawsuit, which suggests the settlement
actually had an overall procompetitive effect. This proposition is
supported by Actavis.
Consistent with the Court’s analysis in Actavis, the defendants will
have the burden of demonstrating a “legitimate justification” for the
165
settlement terms. “Valid justifications” for reverse settlements include
“avoided cost of litigation, payments for other services provided by the
generic challenger to the patentee company, and “any other convincing
166
justifications.” However, the Actavis Court left the interpretation of
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013).
Id. at 2237.
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what “other convincing justifications” may include to the lower courts to
decide.
One justification the defendants could attempt to use to validate
their settlement is the early generic entry date their agreement provided.
The earlier the generic entry date, the greater the settlement’s
procompetitive effect, because it brings lower priced generic drugs to
consumers before the patent’s expiration date. During settlement, the
brand-name patentee and the generic company negotiate a date of
generic entry that will fall somewhere between immediate entry and the
patent’s expiration date. This date is based on each party’s assessment of
its relative strengths in the infringement litigation and “their judgments
167
of the likely outcome of the suit.” For instance, if the patent is strong
and the brand-name pharmaceutical company has a high likelihood of
winning the litigation, the generic entry date will be later than if the
patent is weak and it seems the generic company will prevail.
However, the problem with reverse payment settlements is that they
compel generic companies to accept a later entry date than they would
have agreed to based “solely on the estimated strength of [their]
168
litigation position.” Therefore, plaintiffs may rebut the settling parties’
defense that their settlement was procompetitive by submitting evidence
that the generic challenger would have entered the market even earlier if
it were not for the reverse payments it received from the brand-name
manufacturer.
Illustrating such a rebuttal, the plaintiffs in United Food successfully
presented evidence that the generic manufacturer would have launched
its generic product at an earlier date “at-risk”—that is, as soon as it
obtained FDA approval—had it not been for the reverse payment it
169
received from the brand-name patentee. First, the generic company
had “increased production capacity” and purchased the raw materials
170
necessary to start marketing its product, in anticipation of the launch.
Second, the large settlement the generic manufacturer was able to
procure suggested the patentee’s fear that it would launch the generic
171
drug at-risk. Based on this evidence, the court held that the settling
parties had “not demonstrated procompetitive effects sufficient to offset
172
the alleged injury to competition under the rule of reason analysis.”
Rather, the settlement had an anticompetitive effect because the generic

167. Id. at 223334.
168. Id.
169. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp.
3d 1052, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
170. Id. at 1074.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1075.

Aoki_17 (Hamilton_12.15) (Do Not Delete)

288

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/15/2015 6:05 PM

[Vol. 67:259

company would have released its generic product but for the payment of
173
$96 million in brand product.
Courts have suggested a number of possible justifications by settling
parties for their reverse payments, including a demonstration that the
settlement value was less than the profits the generic would have earned
upon winning the paragraph IV litigation and marketing its generic drug,
or that the settlement increased product output, decreased product price,
174
or increased consumer choice. Additionally, various scholars have also
suggested possible justifications for seemingly large reverse payments,
such as the generic manufacturer’s financial inability to produce and
175
market its drug without a reverse payment from the patentee. Other
proposed justifications are risk aversion and the settling parties’ differing
176
views about their chances of prevailing in litigation.
As an alternative to justifying their settlement terms, the defendant
parties can fulfill their burden by proving that the patentee drug
manufacturer would have likely prevailed in the underlying patent
infringement lawsuit. Courts have commented that large, unexplained
reverse payments are a strong indicator of a patent’s weakness and that
the generic challenger would have succeeded in invaliding that patent
had they continued litigation instead of settling and accepting the
177
patentee’s reverse payment. By showing that the patentee would have
likely prevailed, the settling parties eliminate this presumption. This
proves that the reverse payments did not prolong a monopoly the
patentee would have lost through continued litigation, and suggests that
the settlement’s procompetitive effects outweigh its negative effects.
Any settlement that allows a generic to enter the market prior to a
valid patent’s expiration date, even if that entry date is still far into the
178
future, has an overall procompetitive effect that benefits consumers.
This is because without the agreement, the generic drug would not be
179
released until the patent’s expiration. For this reason, settling parties
should be given the opportunity to justify their choice to enter into a

173. Id. at 1068.
174. Id. at 1067.
175. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts
Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent
Litigation, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 114 (2010).
176. Barry C. Harris et al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 Antitrust 83 (2014).
177. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236–37 (2013); see, e.g., United Food, 74 F. Supp. 3d at
1072 (holding that unexplained, large payments may suggest that generic challenger would have
prevailed had they continued litigation, proving either that patent was invalid or not infringed by its
generic product).
178. See Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 19 Annals Health L. 367, 376–77 (2010).
179. Id.
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settlement, even when it appears on first glance that the payment to the
generic is unduly large. As mentioned by courts and scholars discussing
this issue, antitrust scrutiny cannot be applied too strictly to reverse
payments settlements. Strict antitrust scrutiny would prevent an “easy
way out” of litigation for companies who attempt to legitimately market
a generic drug but are sued by a patentee brand-name company for
180
patent infringement. If strict antitrust scrutiny were applied, the
generic company would be forced to either proceed with expensive
181
litigation or drop its pursuit of marketing a generic entirely. This result
would reduce the Hatch-Waxman Act’s effectiveness at promoting
generic challenges to invalid patents and increasing the availability of
lower priced generic drugs to consumers.
Therefore, if the settling defendants are able to fulfill this burden
and provide a valid justification for their settlement terms or prove the
patentee likely would have prevailed in the underlying patent infringement
suit, the complaint alleging unlawful anticompetitive conduct will be
dismissed. However, if the settling defendants are unable to meet their
burden, their settlement will be deemed anticompetitive and in violation
of antitrust law.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Actavis did not intend to limit antitrust scrutiny to
reverse payment settlements with monetary terms. Courts that interpret
Actavis in this way are creating a loophole for pharmaceutical
companies, allowing them to engage in anticompetitive behavior by
simply structuring their settlements to avoid cash payments. There is
already an increasing trend of unconventional, nonmonetary terms in
settlements between brand-name patentees and generic manufacturers.
To prevent these pharmaceutical companies from engaging in
anticompetitive behavior, the Actavis rule of reason antitrust test cannot
be applied solely to cash settlements. Intentionally anticompetitive
agreements that prolong monopolies and hinder competition, with no
significant procompetitive effect, are the exact type of behavior the
Actavis Court sought to eliminate. To fulfill the intent of the Court, the
holding of Actavis should be applied to both monetary and nonmonetary
settlements.
However, until the Supreme Court decides to reexamine the issue of
pharmaceutical reverse payment settlements and provide further
guidance to its antitrust rule of reason analysis, the uncertainties,
180. See FTC v. Abbvie Inc., No. 14-5151, 2015 LEXIS 59115, at *16 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2015);
Allison A. Schmidt, Competition Ahead? The Legal Landscape for Reverse Payment Settlements After
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 493, 515–16 (2014).
181. See Abbvie Inc., 2015 LEXIS 59115, at *16; Schmidt, supra note 180, at 515–16.
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debates, and divergent holdings will only continue. This Note’s proposed
model provides guidance for applying Actavis to reverse payment
settlements, including those with nonmonetary provisions, and analyzing
the settlement terms for antitrust law violations. Adopting this
framework would create more consistent holdings while also addressing
the larger anticompetitive problems at issue.
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Appendix A: Defined Terms
Brand-name company/manufacturer = The owner of the patent (“patentee”).
This pharmaceutical company produces and sells the brand-name drug.
The brand-name company is the party that made the “reverse payment” at
issue, to a generic drug company, presumably to incentivize the generic company
to delay sale of its generic version of the brand-name drug.
Brand-name drug = The pharmaceutical drug produced and sold by the
brand-name pharmaceutical company.
Brand-name drugs tend to be fairly expensive during the patent’s term
because there are no competing drugs in the marketplace.
Complaint = In this Note, “the complaint” refers to the suit brought by the
FTC or other interested parties (“plaintiffs”) against the “settling parties” (i.e.,
the brand-name and generic drug companies). In the complaint, the plaintiffs
allege that the settling parties engaged in anticompetitive behavior (via their
reverse payment settlement) that violates antitrust law.
Exclusivity period / marketing exclusivity period = The 180-days of
marketing exclusivity that the Hatch-Waxman Act grants to the first generic
company to successfully apply to market a generic version of a brand-name drug,
through the FDA’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) process.
It is this 180-day exclusivity period that allows the brand-name and generic
drug companies to enter into reverse payment settlements that restrain
competition and preserve the brand-name manufacturer’s monopoly.
First-filer = The first generic company to file an application with the FDA
to produce a generic version of an existing brand-name drug.
Reverse payment settlements are generally between a generic first-filer and
brand-name pharmaceutical company, with the generic first-filer accepting
payment to delay release of their generic drug.
Generic challenger/company = The “first-filer.” The generic company
initially filed with the FDA to market a generic version of the brand-name drug,
but then settled with the brand-name company and agreed to delay release of its
generic drug in exchange for payment.
Hatch-Waxman Act = Enacted in response to rising pharmaceutical costs,
the Hatch-Waxman Act aims to speed up the FDA approval process of generic
drugs.
However, certain provisions of the Hatch-Waxman, specifically the 180-day
marketing exclusivity period granted to the generic first-filer, create a scenario
that allows the settling parties’ to enter into reverse payment settlements that
delay competition.
Patent infringement lawsuit = The initial lawsuit, between the brand-name
drug company and generic company, that triggered the reverse payment
settlement at issue in the antitrust lawsuit.
In this initial lawsuit, the brand-name drug company sued the generic
company for patent infringement. These two “settling parties” then agreed to a
“reverse payment settlement,” in which the brand-name company paid the
generic company, presumably to delay release of its generic drug.
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Patentee = the brand-name pharmaceutical company who owns the patent
on the drug at issue
Plaintiffs = The parties bringing the complaint against the settling parties
for engaging in unlawful anticompetitive behavior through their reverse payment
settlement. This may be the FTC or other interested parties.
Reverse payment settlements / Pay for delay settlements = An agreement
in which a brand-name pharmaceutical company makes a payment to a
competing company that was attempting to market a generic version of the
brand-name drug, in the course of a patent infringement settlement.
Reverse payment settlements raise antitrust concerns because they delay
the availability of low-cost, generic drugs to consumers. The concern is that the
payment was an incentive to the generic company to keep its competing drug off
the market until a specified, delayed date.
Settling parties = the brand-name pharmaceutical company (the patentee)
and the generic company (the first-filer) involved in the reverse payment
settlement at issue.
The two settling parties are both defendants in the antitrust lawsuit, which
alleges that their reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law.

